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Cruise Contracts, Public Policy, and
Foreign Forum Selection Clauses
JOHN F. COYLE*
A cruise ship contract is the prototypical contract of
adhesion. The passenger is presented with the contract on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. If she refuses to sign, the ship sails
without her. To ensure that cruise companies do not draft
one-sided contracts that are unfair to passengers, Congress
has enacted a number of statutes that regulate these
agreements. One such statute is 46 U.S.C. § 30509. This law
stipulates that any contract provision that limits the liability
of the cruise company for personal injury or death is void as
against public policy if the ship stops at a U.S. port.
In recent years, cruise companies have sought to develop
a workaround to this rule for non-U.S. residents. The
workaround involves (1) a foreign forum selection clause,
and (2) a foreign choice-of-law clause. When a suit is filed
against the cruise company in U.S. court, the company will
invoke the foreign forum selection clause and ask for the
case to be dismissed. When the case is refiled in the foreign
court, the cruise company will then argue that the choice-oflaw clause compels the application of the Athens
Convention, an international treaty that caps the liability of
cruise companies in negligence cases. In this way, the
companies seek to use forum selection clauses and choiceof-law clauses in tandem to achieve a goal—limting their
tort liability to passengers via contract—that would
ordinarily be prohibited by 46 U.S.C. § 30509.
* Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Many thanks to Martin Davies, Bill Dodge, and Kate Lewins
for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks to Carleigh Zeman
for excellent research assistance.
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This workaround should not work. Indeed, there are
dozens of cases where U.S. courts have refused to enforce
forum selection clauses in analogous situations. In 2012,
however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
expressly blessed the use of the workaround in cruise ship
contracts. This Article first critiques this Eleventh Circuit
decision and identifies its many shortcomings. It then draws
upon analogous cases from other areas of U.S. law to
propose a new analytical framework for evaluating when the
courts should and should not enforce foreign forum selection
clauses in cruise ship contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
There are relatively few federal statutes that directly regulate the
terms of contracts between private actors. One such statute is 46
U.S.C. § 30509.1 That statute prohibits cruise companies from writing provisions into their passenger contracts that limit the company’s liability for personal injury or death incurred on cruises that
stop at a U.S. port.2 The policy goal underlying this statute is
straightforward. A cruise contract is the prototypical contract of adhesion.3 Absent the constraints imposed by the statute, a cruise company could write language into its passenger contracts absolving the
company from liability for passenger injuries even when the company was at fault.4 The statute clearly states that such provisions are
void as against U.S. public policy and directs courts not to give them
any effect.5
Over the past decade, cruise companies have worked diligently
to develop a workaround to this law for non-U.S. residents. First,
the companies write choice-of-law clauses selecting the law of the
passenger’s home country into their passenger contracts.6 In many
cases, the enforcement of such clauses will result in the application
of the Athens Convention, a multilateral treaty which caps the liability of cruise ship companies in tort cases.7 When the Athens Convention applies, an injured cruise ship passenger generally cannot

1

46 U.S.C. § 30509(a) (“(1) In general. The owner, master, manager, or
agent of a vessel transporting passengers between ports in the United States, or
between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country, may not include
in a regulation or contract a provision limiting—(A) the liability of the owner,
master, or agent for personal injury or death caused by the negligence or fault of
the owner or the owner’s employees or agents; or (B) the right of a claimant for
personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction. (2) Voidness.
A provision described in paragraph (1) is void.”).
2
See Robert D. Peltz, The Athens Convention Revisited, 43 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 491, 491 (2012) (discussing application of section 30509 to the Athens Convention when the ship does not visit a U.S. port).
3
See id. at 507.
4
See id. at 496.
5
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a).
6
See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 2, at 515 (observing that cruise companies write
choice-of-law clauses into their contracts).
7
See id. at 492, 515.
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recover more than approximately $66,000 in a tort suit.8 In this manner, the cruise companies seek to use a choice-of-law clause to make
an end run around the statutory prohibition on liability caps imposed
by U.S. law.
The problem with this strategy, of course, is that there is no guarantee that a U.S. court will enforce a choice-of-law clause on these
facts. To get around this problem, the cruise companies have added
a second provision to their standard-form passenger contracts. This
second provision is a forum selection clause that selects the courts
of the foreign passenger’s home country.9 The companies believe
(rightly) that the courts of the passenger’s home country are far more
likely to enforce a choice-of-law clause that will lead to the application of their own law—and the Athens Convention—than a court in
the United States.10 The forum selection clause leads to the enforcement of the choice-of-law clause. The choice-of-law clause leads to
the Athens Convention. The Athens Convention leads to the imposition of liability caps.
When a foreign passenger sues a cruise company in a U.S. court,
therefore, the company will ask the court to enforce the foreign forum selection clause.11 In the overwhelming majority of cases, this
request will be granted. When the suit is later filed in the courts of
8
The Athens Convention limits the liability of a cruise company to its passengers to 46,666 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). As of March 26, 2021, 46,666
SDRs was equal to roughly $66,000. For countries that have ratified the 2002
Protocol to the Athens Convention, the liability of a cruise company is capped at
400,000 SDRs (roughly $568,000). See generally Jeremy Epstein et al., Are You
Worth Only 46,666 SDRs if You Die or Are Injured When Cruising Abroad?, 28
LA. ADVOCS. 21, 23–25 (2013) (discussing practical consequences that flow from
these limits on liability); Robert D. Peltz & Vincent J. Warger, Amendments to
Athens’ Convention Threaten US Maritime Law, 2001 INT’L TRAVEL L.J. 170,
170 (2001).
9
See Peltz, supra note 2, at 494.
10
Once a country ratifies the Athens Convention, the treaty becomes a part
of that country’s law. If the cruise contract falls within the scope of Article 2 of
the Convention—because the ship flies the flag of a party state, the contract was
entered in a party state, or the place of departure or destination is a party state—
then the Convention must be applied by the ratifying country’s courts irrespective
of any choice-of-law clause in the contract. See Angelica L. Boutwell, The Athens
Convention and Limitation of Liability in U.S. Federal Courts: While Communication Is Key, Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 43 U. MIA. INTER-AMERICAN
L. REV. 523, 524–27 (2012).
11
See id.
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the foreign nation, the company will ask the foreign court to enforce
the choice-of-law clause.12 In the overwhelming majority of cases,
again, this request will be granted and the liability limitations set
forth in the Athens Convention will be applied.13 In this manner, the
cruise companies seek to use choice-of-law clauses and forum selection clauses in tandem to defang the express prohibition on liability limitations set forth in section 30509.14
As a general rule, U.S. courts do not permit private actors to use
a combination of choice-of-law and forum selection clauses to produce litigation outcomes that are contrary to public policy.15 In Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., however, the Eleventh Circuit did precisely that.16 The Myhra court was asked to enforce a forum selection clause requiring a lawsuit by an English passenger against a cruise company to be brought in England.17 The
plaintiff argued that the English forum selection clause was unenforceable because its enforcement would lead to the enforcement of
the choice-of-law clause and, ultimately, to the liability limitations
in the Athens Convention.18 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, ruled in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the case in favor
of an English forum.19 In so doing, it gave its stamp of approval to
the contractual workaround to section 30509 described above.
This Article explains why the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Myhra is flawed. It first reviews the relevant case law from the U.S.
Supreme Court relating to the enforceability of forum selection
clauses. It then discusses a long string of cases in which U.S. courts
have refused to enforce forum selection clauses when the effect
would be to evade mandatory laws. This Article next evaluates and
critiques the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Myhra against the backdrop of these other cases. It shows that the Myhra decision cites to
virtually none of the relevant precedents and reaches an outcome
that is inconsistent with U.S. public policy. It then shows that
12

See id.
See id.
14
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a).
15
See infra Part III.
16
See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233,
1246–47 (11th Cir. 2012).
17
See id. at 1235–36.
18
See id. at 1237–39.
19
See id. at 1246–47; see also infra Part IV.
13
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subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases grappling with this issue are in
many respects even more problematic than Myhra. The Article concludes by calling upon the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a new framework for evaluating the enforceability of foreign forum selection
clauses in cruise ship contracts in cases implicating the Athens Convention.
I.
PUBLIC POLICY AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
When a court in the United States is called upon to determine
whether an outbound forum selection clause is enforceable, it will
generally look first to the test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1972 in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.20 In that case, the
Court identified three reasons why a forum selection clause might
be unenforceable.21 First, the Court stated that a clause should not
be enforced if it was unreasonable.22 Second, the Court stated that a
clause should not be enforced if it was subject to a contract defense
such as fraud.23 Third, the Court stated that a clause should not be
given effect if it was contrary to public policy.24 Specifically, the
Court held that “[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be
held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
statute or by judicial decision.”25
Nineteen years later, the Court provided some additional guidance as to when a forum selection clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.26 The
Court was called upon to decide whether enforcing a forum selection
20
See John F. Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum
Selection Clauses in State Court, 96 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at
3–4) (on file with author). “An outbound forum selection clause is a contractual
provision stipulating that any litigation between the parties must occur in a forum
other than the one in which the suit was filed.” Id. at 7. Any forum selection clause
selecting a foreign court will be treated as an outbound clause when suit is filed
in the United States.
21
See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1972).
22
See id. at 10, 15.
23
See id. at 15.
24
See id.
25
Id. at 15.
26
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1991).
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clause requiring a resident of Washington to bring suit against a
cruise line in Florida contravened the strong public policy of the
United States.27 The Court concluded that requiring the plaintiff to
travel across the country to Florida to sue did not “weaken” her ability to bring a lawsuit in a court of competent jurisdiction within the
meaning of the relevant statute.28 Accordingly, the Court held the
forum selection clause was enforceable.29 The Court in Carnival
Cruise did not consider—because it had no reason to consider—
what would happen if a forum selection clause required a plaintiff
to bring suit in a court outside of the United States. Nor did it consider what would happen if the contract contained a choice-of-law
clause selecting the law of a non-U.S. jurisdiction.
In 2013, the Court revisited the topic of forum selection clauses
in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District
Court.30 In this case, the Court identified the proper procedural
mechanism for enforcing forum selection clauses in federal court.31
When a forum selection clause calls for the case to be resolved by a
different federal court, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs the issue.32 When the forum selection clause names a state court
or a foreign court, by contrast, the Court held that the motion to dismiss should be evaluated through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.33 Significantly, nothing in Atlantic Marine addresses the
threshold question of whether a forum selection clause is enforceable; the Court expressly stated that its “analysis presupposes a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”34 The decision leaves untouched the analytical framework for determining whether a forum
27

See id. at 587–90.
Id. at 595–96; see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (“It shall be unlawful for
the . . . owner of any vessel transporting passengers . . . to insert in any . . . contract, or agreement any provision or limitation . . . purporting in such event to
lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent
jurisdiction on the question of liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of
damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in any such rule,
regulation, contract, or agreement are hereby declared to be against public policy
and shall be null and void and of no effect.”).
29
See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595–97.
30
See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Distr. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 52–54 (2013).
31
See id. at 59.
32
Id. at 59.
33
Id. at 60.
34
Id. at 62 n.5.
28
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selection clause is enforceable set forth in The Bremen and Carnival
Cruise. Under both of these cases, a forum selection clause that is
contrary to public policy as declared in a statute is unenforceable.
II.

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES AND THE LOGIC OF ANTIWAIVER
An anti-waiver statute is a law which states that a particular right
may not be waived by contract.35 Such provisions commonly appear
in laws intended to protect consumers.36 If consumer protection laws
lacked an anti-waiver statute, then it would be a simple matter for
companies who interact with consumers to evade such laws. They
would simply require consumers to sign agreements waiving any
and all rights conferred by the laws at the time of purchase. To avoid
this outcome, legislatures typically include an anti-waiver statute in
their consumer protection legislation declaring that the rights conferred by the statute may not be waived.37
There are, however, other ways by which a company may seek
to evade a given state’s consumer protection laws. Instead of writing
an express waiver into the contract, the company may choose instead to write a choice-of-law clause into that agreement selecting
the law of a state that lacks a consumer protection statute. If the
choice-of-law clause is enforced, then the choice-of-law clause will
operate in precisely the same way as an express waiver and the consumer will be deprived of her rights under the enacting state’s consumer protection laws. Accordingly, most courts will refuse to enforce choice-of-law clauses selecting a jurisdiction whose law lacks
equivalent legal protections to the jurisdiction that enacted the antiwaiver statute.38 In the view of these courts, a company may not use
a choice-of-law clause indirectly to obtain an outcome that it could
not realize through an express waiver in the agreement.39

35

Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 27.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN § 45.50.542 (West 2020) (“A waiver by a
consumer of the provisions of [this Act] is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void.”).
37
See, e.g., id.
38
See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 27–28.
39
See id. at 27.
36
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When a company writes both a choice-of-law clause and a forum
selection clause into its agreement with a consumer, the situation
becomes still more complicated. One can easily imagine a scenario
where a choice-of-law clause would not be enforced in the courts in
State A but would be enforced in the courts of State B. In this scenario, the decision whether to enforce the forum selection clause selecting the courts of State B becomes a de facto decision as to
whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause.40 Where a contract contains both a choice-of-law and a forum selection clause, therefore, a
court may decline to give effect to the forum selection clause if it
believes that its enforcement will lead to the enforcement of the
choice-of-law clause and, ultimately, to the waiver of non-waivable
rights.
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly endorsed this logic
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.41 In
that case, the Court was asked to decide whether “the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the
claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust
claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration.”42 In concluding that antitrust claims were arbitrable—and that the dispute must be resolved
by arbitration in Japan—the Court specifically noted that the Japanese arbitrators would be applying U.S. antitrust law to resolve the
issue.43 There was no danger, in other words, that a choice-of-law
clause would operate to deprive the plaintiffs of the antitrust protections conferred by U.S. law.
The Court specifically noted, however, that a different result
would obtain if the enforcement of a forum selection clause would
ultimately result in the application of foreign antitrust law.44 As the
Court explained, “[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of40

If the court enforces the forum selection clause, the case will be heard by
the courts of State A. These courts will enforce the choice-of-law clause and this
action will result in the waiver of non-waivable rights. If the court refuses to enforce the forum selection clause, the case will be heard by the courts of State B.
These courts will refuse to enforce the choice-of-law clause and this action will
not result in the waiver of any non-waivable rights.
41
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
624–28 (1985).
42
Id. at 629.
43
See id. at 637 n.19.
44
See id.
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law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.”45 An attempt to use a choice-of-law clause and forum selection clause to effectuate the waiver of non-waivable rights conferred
by U.S. antitrust law was, in the Court’s view, contrary to U.S. public policy.46 In such cases, it held that the lower courts should decline
to give effect to a forum selection clause in the first instance.
III.
ANALOGOUS CASE LAW
In the thirty-five years since Mitsubishi was decided, U.S. courts
have repeatedly invoked the logic of anti-waiver to strike down forum selection clauses on the grounds that their enforcement will
eventually lead to the application of law that is contrary to the public
policy of the forum. This Part below provides a brief overview of
these cases.
A.
California Labor Law
The California state courts have invoked the logic of anti-waiver
when refusing to enforce forum selection clauses on a number of
occasions. These state cases are not binding on federal courts. The
reasoning underlying these decisions, however, is fully consistent
with the logic of anti-waiver.
In Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., for example, a California
worker sued her Texas-based employer in California state court for
violating the California Labor Code.47 The Texas defendant sought
to stay or dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiff’s employment agreement with the defendant contained an exclusive forum selection clause choosing Texas.48 The contract also contained
a Texas choice-of-law clause.49 In evaluating whether the forum
45

Id. (emphasis added).
See Joseph R. Brubaker & Michael P. Daly, Twenty-Five Years of the
“Prospective Waiver” Doctrine in International Dispute Resolution: Mitsubishi’s
Footnote Nineteen Comes to Life in the Eleventh Circuit, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 1233,
1234 (2010).
47
See Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 626 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015).
48
See id. at 616–17.
49
See id. at 616.
46
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selection clause was enforceable, the court noted that the California
Labor Code contained an anti-waiver provision which stated that
“no provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set
aside by a private agreement . . . whether written, oral, or implied.”50
In light of this statutory language, the court announced that the
“California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do
so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in
a way that violates our state’s public policy.”51 The key inquiry, the
court held, was whether a court in the chosen state—Texas—would
apply a law that was as protective of the plaintiff’s rights as the law
of California.52 In the court’s words:
[A] defendant seeking to enforce a mandatory forum
selection clause bears the burden to show enforcement will not in any way diminish the plaintiff’s unwaivable statutory rights. By definition, this showing
requires the defendant to compare the plaintiff’s
rights if the clause is not enforced and the plaintiff’s
rights if the clause is enforced. Indeed, a defendant
can meet its burden only by showing the foreign forum provides the same or greater rights than California, or the foreign forum will apply California law
on the claims at issue.53
Since the defendant in Verdugo could not show that the Texas
court would provide the plaintiff with the same or greater rights as
set forth in the California Labor Code, the court held that the forum
selection clause selecting Texas was not enforceable.54
50

Id. at 622.
Id. at 618.
52
See id.; see also Kan. City Grill Cleaners, LLC v. BBQ Cleaner, LLC, 454
P.3d 608, 615 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (“The potential likelihood that an agreed-to
forum would apply an accompanying choice-of-law provision favoring its law and
disfavoring the protections in the KCPA bolsters our conclusion that the forumselection clause is unenforceable in this case.”).
53
Verdugo, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 626 (emphasis added).
54
See id. at 630; see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d
699, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Enforcement of the contractual forum selection
and choice of law clauses would be the functional equivalent of a contractual
51
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B.
Federal Securities Laws
The federal courts have utilized a similar analytical framework
to assess whether the anti-waiver provisions in the federal securities
laws invalidate a forum selection clause choosing the courts in another country.55 In a series of cases involving Lloyd’s of London,
the lower federal courts were called upon to decide whether a forum
selection clause selecting England was invalid because its enforcement would result in the application of English securities law.56 The
agreements in question also contained choice-of-law clauses selecting English law.57
In analyzing this question, the federal circuit courts of appeals
recognized that a forum selection clause selecting England is enforceable only if English law will permit plaintiffs to vindicate their

waiver of the consumer protections under the CLRA and, thus, is prohibited under
California law.”); Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics Int’l, Inc., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Given California’s inability to guarantee application of its Franchise Investment Law in the contract forum, its courts
must necessarily do the next best thing. In determining the ‘validity and enforceability’ of forum selection provisions in franchise agreements, its courts must put
the burden on the franchisor to show that litigation in the contract forum will not
diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded California franchisees under
California law.”); Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(“California’s policy to protect securities investors, without more, would probably
justify denial of enforcement of the choice of forum provision, although a failure
to do so might not constitute an abuse of discretion; but section 25701, which
renders void any provision purporting to waive or evade the Corporate Securities
Law, removes that discretion and compels denial of enforcement.”). But see
Campbell v. Marriott Ownership Resorts Inc., No. E064139, 2016 WL 817876, at
*2–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2016) (concluding that California legislation relating
to time shares did not contain nonwaivable rights and therefore did not bar the
enforcement of the clause).
55
See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be
void.”).
56
See Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting Parties to
Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
57, 81–83 (1997).
57
See id.
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substantive rights in a manner consistent with the U.S. securities
laws.58 In the words of the Second Circuit:
We believe that if the [plaintiffs] were able to show
that available remedies in England are insufficient to
deter British issuers from exploiting American investors through fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate
disclosure, we would not hesitate to condemn the
choice of law, forum selection and arbitration clauses
as against public policy.59
In the cases involving Lloyd’s, every federal court of appeal to
consider the issue concluded that the English securities laws do provide sufficient protections to U.S. investors. Accordingly, these
courts have enforced forum selection clauses selecting the English
courts.60 If a plaintiff was able to show that the securities laws of
another nation—India, for example, or Brazil—did not provide
equivalent protections to U.S. investors, however, then the logic of
the above decisions makes clear that the foreign forum selection
clause would be unenforceable.61
58

See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364–65 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1365.
60
See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 148 F.3d 1285, 1298 (11th Cir.
1998); see also Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); Shell v. R.W. Sturge,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1229–30 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d
156, 160 (7th Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d
953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992).
61
There are a number of state cases that have adopted the same basic approach to the inquiry. See Moon v. CSA-Credit Sols. of Am., Inc., 696 S.E.2d
486, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“[I]f enforced, the contract’s forum selection and
choice of law provisions requiring the Moons to bring their action before a Texas
court applying Texas law would operate in tandem to deprive them of specific
statutory protections . . . . Because this would violate Georgia’s public policy established in OCGA § 18-5-1 et seq. relating to debt adjustment agreements and
encourage debt adjustment practices in Georgia contrary to that policy, the forum
selection and choice of law provisions in the contract are invalid and unenforceable.”); Pepe v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 750 A.2d 1167, 1168–69 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2000) (anti-waiver provision in Connecticut Franchise Law precluded enforcement of forum selection clause); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 680,
685–86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (anti-waiver provision in Maryland Workers
Compensation Law precluded enforcement of forum selection clause); Maher &
59
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C.
Federal Civil Rights Statutes
U.S. courts have used a similar analytical framework to determine whether foreign forum selection clauses may be enforced
when the plaintiff asserts a claim under federal civil rights laws. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that a person cannot preemptively waive the rights conferred by these laws.62 To evaluate the
validity of a foreign forum selection clause in civil rights cases, the
courts have held that they must first analyze whether the foreign law
offers protections that are similar to those provided under U.S. civil
rights law.63
In Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, the Second Circuit undertook just
such an analysis.64 A terminated employee sued his former employer
in federal court in New York, arguing that his termination violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).65 The employer
moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that the employment agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant contained an exclusive
forum selection clause selecting the English courts.66 The agreement
also contained a choice-of-law clause selecting English law.67 In
weighing whether the forum selection clause was enforceable, the
Assocs. v. Quality Cabinets, 640 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“The
only reasonable interpretation of section 2 of the [Illinois Sales Representative
Act] is that the legislature was announcing fundamental public policy when it decided that any contract purporting to waive any provisions of the Act is void.
Therefore, we void the forum-selection clause of the agreement in this matter.”).
Again, these state cases are not binding on federal courts. The logic underlying
these decisions, however, is consistent with the approach adopted by the federal
courts.
62
See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009) (stating that a
“substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51, (1974) (“[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”); see also Acharya v.
Microsoft Corp., 354 P.3d 908, 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (“Under Washington
law, the right to be free from discrimination is nonnegotiable and cannot be
waived in contract. But, under the forum selection clause and the choice of law
provision, Acharya’s [Washington Law Against Discrimination] claim would not
be cognizable. Preventing a Washington plaintiff from enforcing Washington law
is contrary to public policy.”).
63
See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 229 (2d Cir. 2014).
64
See id.
65
See id. at 214.
66
See id.
67
See id.
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Second Circuit observed that the essential question was whether
English law provided protections to employees that were equivalent
to those in the ADA.68 As the court explained: “We would hesitate
to enforce a forum selection clause if the party resisting enforcement
demonstrated that the foreign forum’s anti-discrimination law was
insufficient to deter employers from violating the . . . civil rights of
individuals with disabilities.”69
After reviewing the substantive content of English anti-discrimination law, the court concluded that English law contained protections that were broadly similar to those in U.S. law.70 Indeed, the
court found that English law was actually more favorable to the
plaintiff in some respects.71 Accordingly, the court held that there
was no public policy rationale for refusing to enforce the English
forum selection clause.72 If the court had concluded that English law
provided less robust protections than U.S. law, however, there can
be little doubt that it would have declined to enforce the forum selection clause requiring the suit to be brought in England.

68

See id. at 229.
Id.
70
See id.
71
See id. (stating “The only purported inadequacies with English anti-discrimination law that [plaintiff] identifies are its shorter statute of limitations period, the unavailability of prevailing party attorney’s fees, and the cost of proceeding in the U.K.,” and holding that “[u]nlike U.S. federal law, English anti-discrimination law allows for claims based on sexual orientation.”).
72
See id.; see also Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT Tech. Servs., 789
S.E.2d 310, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“Tesoro has failed to carry its burden to
show that Virginia law is materially different from, much less in conflict with,
that of Georgia on the legal points raised by Tesoro’s complaint. Tesoro, therefore, has wholly failed to make a strong case . . . that enforcement of the parties’
forum selection clauses that Tesoro drafted are likely to produce a result that violates a public policy of Georgia because the same or similar remedies are not
available in Virginia.”); see also Crump Ins. Servs. v. All Risks, Ltd., 727 S.E.2d
131, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“The appellants here have not shown that . . . proceedings in a Maryland court would likely produce a result that offends the public
policy of Georgia. Absent such a showing, no compelling reason appears to avoid
the forum-selection clause.”); Holeman v. Nat’l Bus. Inst., 94 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2002) (“Because Holeman has made no effort to show that a Georgia
court would not apply Texas law, Holeman has failed to demonstrate how enforcement of the forum selection clause would subvert Texas public policy.”).
69
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D.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
In 1936, Congress enacted section 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (“COGSA”).73 This provision states:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of
carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability
for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods,
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties
and obligations provided in this section, or lessening
such liability otherwise than as provided in this Act,
shall be null and void and of no effect.74
This statement of public policy is focused on contract provisions that
relieve or lessen a carrier’s liability when goods entrusted to it are
lost or damaged.75 Although this anti-waiver statute is different from
those discussed above in several respects, the courts use the same
basic analytical framework to determine whether a forum selection
clause should be enforced in cases implicating the statute.76
In Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. M/V Spring Wave,
for example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana cited section 3(8) in refusing to enforce a forum selection

73

46 U.S.C. § 30701.
Id.
75
See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540–
41 (1995).
76
See id. In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, the Supreme
Court considered the question of whether a foreign arbitration clause was unenforceable because it would lead to the application of foreign law and subsequently
to a “lessening” of liability under section 3(8). Id. at 530–31. The Court ultimately
deemed this question “premature” and declined to offer a definitive answer to the
question. Id. at 540. The Court’s reasoning in Sky Reefer, however, suggests that
there are important differences between foreign arbitration clauses and foreign
forum selection clauses when it comes to analyzing this question. See Cent. Nat’lGottesman, Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff,” 204 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“An integral component of the Court’s reasoning in SKY
REEFER was that there existed a subsequent opportunity for the district court to
review the foreign court’s decision to ensure that it comported with the interest in
enforcement of the laws in the [United States] and was not violative of public
policy. Absent this opportunity for review, it is readily apparent that the Court
would have had a much harder time enforcing the forum selection [arbitration]
clause and transferring the case to Japan.”).
74

2021]

CRUISE CONTRACTS

1103

clause selecting the law and courts of Japan.77 In support of this decision, the court noted that there was a strong possibility that a Japanese court would apply Japanese law to enforce one of several provisions in the contract that would lessen the carrier’s liability in contravention of U.S. public policy.78 Accordingly, it declined to enforce the forum selection clause.79 In Central National-Gottesman,
Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff”, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to enforce a forum selection
clause selecting the law and courts of England because the contract
contained an exculpatory clause insulating parties other than the
shipowner from liability that was enforceable under English law.80
The court noted that there was a strong possibility that the English
courts applying English law would adopt a narrower definition of
the word “carrier” than the one followed by the courts in New
York.81 This fact, in the court’s view, justified its decision not to
enforce the forum selection clause.82 And in Y-Tex Corp. v. Schenker, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington refused to enforce a forum selection clause selecting the courts of Germany because the contract contained provisions enforceable under
German law that would reduce the defendant’s obligations to the
plaintiff below what COGSA guaranteed.83
To be sure, not every U.S. court presented with arguments under
section 3(8) has declined to enforce a foreign forum selection clause.
There are a number of cases where the courts have enforced these
77

See Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. v. M/V Spring Wave, 92 F. Supp. 2d 574,
577 (E.D. La. 2000).
78
See id.; see also Kanematsu USA, Inc. v. M/V Ocean Sunrise, No. Civ.A.
01–1702, 2003 WL 21241790, at *5 (E.D. La. May 23, 2003) (declining to enforce Japanese forum selection clause on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA);
Union Steel Am. Co. v. M/V Sanko Spruce, No. CIV.A. 97–5696(JEI), 1998 WL
531824, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1998) (declining to enforce South Korean forum
selection clause on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA).
79
See Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
80
See Cent. Nat’l-Gottesman, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
81
Id. at 681.
82
See id.
83
See Y-Tex Corp. v. Schenker, Inc., No. C10-1264 RSL, 2011 WL
2292352, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2011); see also Heli-Lift Ltd. v. M/V
OOCL FAITH, No. CV 00-13191 GAF(CWX), 2001 WL 34084370, at *1, 7–8
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2001) (declining to enforce German forum selection clause
on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA).

1104

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1087

clauses in situations where in rem actions were unavailable in the
chosen forum.84 In none of these cases, however, did the foreign law
expressly limit the plaintiff’s recovery to a sum below that guaranteed by COGSA.85 Accordingly, even the results in these cases are
consistent with the argument that a party may not rely on foreign
forum selection clauses as a backdoor way of obtaining results otherwise prohibited by U.S. law.
IV.
CRITIQUING MYHRA
The facts of Myhra are straightforward.86 Myhra, a resident of
England, traveled to Miami, Florida, in 2009 to go on a cruise operated by Royal Caribbean.87 While at sea, Myhra became ill and was
diagnosed with Legionnaire’s Disease.88 He subsequently died as a
result of his illness.89 His estate brought a negligence action against
Royal Caribbean in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida.90 Royal Caribbean moved to dismiss the suit on the basis
of a forum selection clause in the passenger contract requiring litigation to be brought in England.91 That contract also contained a
choice-of-law clause stating that it would be governed by English
law.92
84

See Liberty Woods Int’l, Inc. v. M.V. Ocean Quartz, 889 F.3d 127, 133 (3d
Cir. 2018) (concluding that inability to proceed in rem was not sufficient to require the court to set aside the forum selection clause on public policy grounds);
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. MV DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (9th Cir.
1997) (same); see also Glyphics Media, Inc. v. M.V. Conti Singapore, No. 02 Civ.
4398(NRB), 2003 WL 1484145, at *4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 21, 2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that long delays in Indian courts provided a basis for invalidating
Indian forum selection clause because Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof).
85
See Jewel Seafoods Ltd. v. M/V Peace River, 39 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631, 633
(D.S.C. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff had “failed to demonstrate that China’s
substantive law would reduce the carrier’s obligations to the cargo owner below
what COGSA guarantees” and enforcing forum selection clause).
86
See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1236
(11th Cir. 2012).
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
See id. at 1236–37.
92
See id. at 1239.
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England was at that time a party to the Athens Convention.93
This Convention imposes liability caps for cruise ship operators
with respect to claims brought by passengers.94 At the time that
Myhra was decided in 2012, this cap was set at roughly $73,000.95
In 2014, the United Kingdom ratified the 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention that raised the cap.96 Under the new Protocol, the
cap is now set at roughly $568,000.97
Myhra’s estate argued that the forum selection clause in the
cruise contract was void on public policy grounds.98 Specifically,
the estate argued that Congress had enacted a statute—46 U.S.C.
§ 30509—which invalidates any contract provision that limits the
liability of a cruise ship operator transporting passengers through a
U.S. port with respect to certain types of claims.99 That statute provides:
(1) In general.—The owner . . . of a vessel transporting passengers between ports in the United States or
between a port in the United States and a port in a
foreign country, may not include in a . . . contract a
provision limiting—

93

See Peltz, supra note 2, at 519.
See id. at 492.
95
See id. at 504.
96
Maria Pittordis & Zoe Triantafyllou, Athens Protocol 2002 in Force from
23 April 2014 for Ratifying States, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=aae7be2d-460a-41d9-b9f8-143bb7207692. As
of March 2021, thirty-one states are parties to the Athens Protocol 2002. Protocol
of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
Their Luggage by Sea, 1974, U.N. TREATY SYS., https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028053bf55&clang=_en (last visited May 15, 2021) [hereinafter 2002 Athens Protocol Parties]. Twenty-seven
states are parties to the original incarnation of the Athens Convention that was
finalized in 1974. Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
Their Luggage by Sea, 1974, U.N. TREATY SYS., https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800cdbb3 (last visited May 15, 2021).
97
See Peltz, supra note 2. Due to changes in foreign exchange rates, the cap
under the original Athens Convention is now set at roughly $66,000.
98
See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1236
(11th Cir. 2012).
99
See id.
94
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(A) the liability of the owner . . . for personal injury or death caused by the negligence or fault of
the owner or the owner’s employees or
agents . . . .
(2) Voidness.--A provision described in paragraph
(1) is void.100
The statute is a close cousin to COGSA section 3(8).101 The key
difference is that while section 3(8) applies to the transportation of
cargo, section 30509 applies to the transportation of passengers.102
The estate argued that since an English court would enforce the English choice-of-law clause and apply the limitations set forth in the
Athens Convention—which at the time capped the liability of cruise
ship companies with respect to passenger claims at around
$73,000—the forum selection clause naming England as the exclusive forum was void as against U.S. public policy as expressed in
section 30509.103
The estate’s arguments were sound. As discussed above, there
are many state and federal court cases where the courts refused to
enforce forum selection clauses in reliance on similar arguments. On
the plaintiff’s telling, Congress enacted a statute that invalidated any
contract clause “limiting” the liability of a cruise ship company for
injuries suffered by passengers.104 If the company had written language into its contract stating that its liability to its passenger was
capped at $73,000, it would have been struck down.105 To allow the
company to obtain the exact same result via the use of a choice-oflaw clause and a forum selection clause, the estate argued, was contrary to the clear intent of the statute.106
100

46 U.S.C. § 305609(a) (emphasis added).
Compare 46 U.S.C. § 30509, with 46 U.S.C. § 30701.
102
Compare 46 U.S.C. § 30509, with 46 U.S.C. § 30701.
103
See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1242.
104
Id. at 1237–38, 1242.
105
See Johnson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 449 F. App’x 846, 847–48
(11th Cir. 2011) (citing section 30509 to invalidate express liability waiver in
contract); see also Boutwell, supra note 10, at 550 (noting that cruise companies
rewrote their passenger contracts in the wake of Ninth Circuit decision invalidating attempt to impose limitations on their liability by expressly referencing the
Athens Convention).
106
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509; see also Boutwell, supra note 10, at 550.
101
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument.107 It held
that the forum selection clause was enforceable, ruled for the defendants, and ordered the case dismissed in favor of an English forum.108 In justifying this conclusion, the court advanced four separate arguments.
A.

Express Liability Waivers Are Different than Choice-ofLaw Clauses
The court stated that “[t]he danger presented by a ship owner’s
unilateral imposition of a limitation on liability is decidedly different from that posed by a valid choice-of-law clause.”109 On this issue, the court is simply incorrect. If the enforcement of a choice-oflaw clause will lead directly to a limitation on the liability of the
owner, then the dangers posed by such a clause are precisely the
same as those posed by the owner’s unilateral imposition of a limitation via an express contract provision.110
B.

There Is No Specific Reference to Forum Selection Clauses
in Section 30509
The court observed that neither section 30509 nor its legislative
history contains any specific reference to forum selection clauses.111
In light of this fact, the court questioned whether it would be “appropriate to extend the scope of the statute to cover forum-selection
clauses.”112 It noted that “[a] prudential respect for the prerogatives
of the political branches counsels that we not infer a statutory limitation on such devices absent an explicit exercise of congressional
judgment.”113 Ultimately, the court decided that the “appropriate
course is to interpret the statute to its plain language unless Congress, by appropriate amendment, makes policy choices on the

107

See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1246–47.
See id.
109
Id.
110
See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 217, 248 (2013).
111
See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243–44.
112
Id. at 1244.
113
See id.
108
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contours of choice-of-forum clauses that involve the Country’s international commercial relationship.”114
In advancing this argument, the court made no mention of
Mitsubishi. In that case, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court stated
that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”115
Nor did the court discuss the dozens of cases referenced above
where state and federal courts relied on the logic of anti-waiver to
invalidate forum selection clauses as a backdoor way of enforcing
choice-of-law clauses that violate public policy.116 Since the Eleventh Circuit failed to discuss any of these cases, we have no way of
knowing whether it believes that they were wrongly decided. This
failure to engage with dozens of contrary decisions—virtually all of
which involved statutes which likewise contain no express reference
to forum selection clauses—casts doubt on the soundness of the
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning.117
114

See id.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 n.19 (1985).
116
See supra notes 47–85 (collecting cases).
117
Even if this were not the case, the forum selection clause in Myhra is arguably invalid under a plain language reading of section 30509. That statute states
that any “provision limiting . . . the liability of the owner . . . for personal injury
or death” shall be “void.” 46 U.S.C. § 30509. The forum selection clause in Myhra
is a “provision” which, if enforced, will ultimately result in “limiting . . . the liability of the owner” via the application of the Athens Convention by the English
court. Id.; see Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1242. In light of this fact, the absence
of any language in the statute specifically referencing forum selection clauses is
immaterial. There is also a textual argument that the forum selection clause here
at issue is invalid under a different part of section 30509. That statute also forbids
cruise ship owners from writing provisions into their contract that “limit . . . the
right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent
jurisdiction.” 46 U.S.C. § 30509. There is no question that a federal court in Florida is a court of “competent jurisdiction” within the meaning of the statute. There
is also no question that the forum selection clause “limits” the right of the plaintiff
to bring suit in those courts by mandating an English forum. This reading of the
statute is, however, probably foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Carnival Cruise that adopted a different interpretation of the statutory text. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) (“By its plain language, the
115
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C.
English Law Provides Similar Protections to U.S. Law
The Myhra court also considered what would happen if the forum selection clause were enforced and the suit proceeded in England.118 It acknowledged that an English court will generally “apply
its own law or enforce the choice-of-law clause of the contract.”119
It further acknowledged that the English courts are likely to give
effect to the liability limitations imposed by the Athens Convention.120 The court did not, however, view this outcome as troubling
because the English courts “would be proceeding along a path not
that different from the course a U.S. court would follow.”121 The
court explained that “other provisions of federal law, specifically the
Death on the High Seas Act, would have limited [the plaintiff’s] recovery.”122 Since the Athens Convention and the Death on the High
Seas Act both limit the plaintiff’s recovery in some manner, the
court reasoned, there is no meaningful difference between the law
of England and the law of the United States in this area and, hence,
no reason not to enforce the forum selection clause.123
While the Eleventh Circuit was correct that the Death on the
High Seas Act limits a plaintiff’s recovery to pecuniary damages, it
was incorrect in its observation that this rule is “not that different”
from the liability limitations set forth in the Athens Convention.124
The Athens Convention, as discussed above, imposes a fixed damages cap on any passenger tort claim brought against a cruise ship
company.125 The Death on the High Seas Act provides that a tort
forum-selection clause before us does not take away respondents’ right to ‘a trial
by [a] court of competent jurisdiction’ and thereby contravene the explicit proscription of § 183c. Instead, the clause states specifically that actions arising out
of the passage contract shall be brought ‘if at all,’ in a court ‘located in the State
of Florida,’ which, plainly, is a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ within the meaning of the statute.”).
118
See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243.
119
Id.
120
See id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1243–44.
123
See id.
124
See 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (“The recovery in an action under this chapter shall
be a fair compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the individuals for
whose benefit the action is brought.” (emphasis added)); Estate of Myhra, 695
F.3d at 1243.
125
See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1237–38.
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plaintiff can recover only certain types of damages—pecuniary damages—but does not cap the overall recovery.126 A liability regime
that limits the type of damages allowed is obviously very different
from a liability regime that caps the allowable damages at a set number. It is also important to note that the Death on the High Seas Act
applies only when there is a death on the high seas.127 If a person
suffers a non-fatal injury on a cruise ship, the Act is inapplicable.128
The liability limitations imposed by the Athens Convention, by contrast, apply to all personal injury claims regardless of whether they
result in the plaintiff’s demise.129
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the court’s
analysis. The language of section 30509 makes clear that U.S. law
is meant to provide a baseline against which to measure the effect
of a contract provision limiting the cruise ship company’s liability.130 If the contract provision seeks to limit the carrier’s liability in
a manner beyond what is permissible under U.S. law, in other words,
it is void on public policy grounds.131 Rather than looking to the
Death on the High Seas Act as a baseline, the court used the mere
existence of the Death on the High Seas Act to justify its conclusion
that liability limitations in the Athens Convention do not violate
U.S. public policy.132 We do not know how much Myhra’s estate
would have been able to recover under the Death on the High Seas
Act and, consequently, we have no way of knowing if this amount
is more or less than the amount the estate could recover under the
126

See 46 U.S.C. § 30303. The impact of limiting liability to pecuniary losses
will vary depending on the plaintiff. The estates of children and retirees will recover less. The estates of high-income workers in the prime of life will recover
more.
127
See 46 U.S.C. § 30303.
128
It is not clear from the facts recounted by either the district court or the
court of appeals whether Myhra died from Legionnaire’s Disease while on board
the ship or after he returned to shore. It would appear, however, that the precise
location of his death is immaterial. The Fifth Circuit has held that “DOHSA also
confers jurisdiction if the decedent is on the high seas at the time he suffers his
mortal injury” even if the decedent’s final moments actually occur on land. Motts
v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2000).
129
See Peltz, supra note 2, at 491–92.
130
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509.
131
See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 17.
132
See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233,
1243–44 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Athens Convention. Without this information, there is no way to tell
whether enforcing the English forum selection clause would have
violated U.S. public policy.
What the court should have done was determine the best-case
damages scenario for the plaintiff under the Death on the High Seas
Act and any other relevant provisions of U.S. law. The court should
have then compared the number to the cap set by the Athens Convention. If the best-case scenario under U.S. law exceeded the cap,
it should have refused to enforce the foreign forum selection clause.
If this best-case scenario fell below the cap, the court should have
enforced the clause. Unfortunately, the Myhra court never undertook this analysis. Instead, it offered conclusory assertions that U.S.
law and English law are not really all that different without undertaking a more searching analysis.133
D.
International Comity Counsels Against Enforcement
The court’s final argument was that the forum selection clause
should be enforced because such provisions play a “very significant
role” in “the maintenance of the present international legal order.”134
The court noted that these clauses “allow the courts of the United
States to respect not only the rights and expressed preferences of
nationals of other countries, but also to respect the ability of other
national jurisdictions to adjudicate disputes.”135 It would be inappropriate, in the court’s view, to “prevent another sovereign from
applying its substantive policy choices to a case involving its own
nationals and its internal commercial relationships.”136
There are two problems with this argument. First, irrespective of
the role that such clauses play in the maintenance of the international
order, the Supreme Court has made clear that forum selection
clauses should not be enforced “if enforcement would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether
declared by statute or by judicial decision.”137 Section 30509 clearly
states the public policy of the United States.138 The suit was brought
133
134
135
136
137
138

See id. at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id.
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509.
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in the United States. Accordingly, the general rule that forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable must cede the field even
if non-enforcement of the clause would offend traditional notions of
international comity.
Second, the United States has an interest in applying its law to
this case because the voyage in question began and ended in Miami,
Florida.139 Section 30509 expressly regulates the terms of passenger
agreements where a vessel is “transporting passengers between ports
in the United States, or between a port in the United States and a
port in a foreign country.”140 Since this voyage satisfied the statutory
criteria, the court should not have concerned itself overmuch with
the general notions of international comity. Instead, it should have
faithfully applied the statute as written by Congress and applied section 30509 to a cruise contract involving a voyage that began and
ended at a U.S. port.141
V.
THE AFTERMATH OF MYHRA
In the decade since Myhra was decided, district courts within the
Eleventh Circuit have cited it to uphold a foreign forum selection
clause on three occasions. A careful review of these decisions reveals that none of the flaws in the Myhra decision have been addressed. Indeed, the reasoning in these subsequent decisions is in
many ways even more problematic than the reasoning in Myhra.
In Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., the Eleventh Circuit upheld
a district court decision enforcing a forum selection clause in a
cruise contract requiring all disputes to be resolved in the courts of
Naples, Italy.142 Italy has ratified the Athens Convention143 and the
contract in question contained an Italian choice-of-law clause.144
Citing Myhra, the Eleventh Circuit held in Lebedinsky that there was
no public policy reason why the Italian forum selection clause
should not be enforced.145 The court reasoned that “Congress’s
139

Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1236.
46 U.S.C. § 30509.
141
Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1236, 1244.
142
Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., 789 F. App’x 196, 198 (11th Cir. 2019).
143
See 2002 Athens Protocol Parties, supra note 96 (listing European Union
as a party that ratified 2002 Athens Protocol).
144
See Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 199.
145
Id. at 203.
140
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opposition to liability limitation provisions ‘was to forbid the unilateral imposition of a limitation of liability by a ship owner without
any recourse to judicial process.’”146 Accordingly, the Lebedinsky
court concluded that “[t]his policy concern does not extend to forum
selection clauses because forum selection clauses merely direct a
dispute to a particular jurisdiction.”147
This argument is flawed for the reasons outlined in Part IV.
When the enforcement of a foreign forum selection clause will inevitably lead to the imposition of a liability limitation expressly prohibited by the plain text of section 30509, the logic of anti-waiver
compels the conclusion that the clause should not be enforced. To
do otherwise is to allow cruise companies to utilize choice-of-law
clauses and forum selection clauses in tandem to effectuate a result
that is expressly prohibited by a federal statute. There is no evidence
that Congress, in enacting section 30509, wished to facilitate workarounds of this sort.
To its credit, the Myhra court acknowledged this fact, even
though it ultimately concluded that the forum selection clause
should be enforced because the limitations imposed by the Athens
Convention were similar to those imposed by the Death on the High
Seas Act.148 The Lebedinsky court, to its discredit, never engaged
with this issue. This oversight is all the more troubling because the
plaintiff in Lebedinsky was alive at the time the suit was brought,
thereby rendering the Death on the High Seas Act inapplicable.149
Since the new contract selected the law and courts of Italy, the Lebedinsky court should have also conducted a thorough comparative
analysis of U.S. and Italian law. It did not. Instead, it cited to a prior
case involving a dead plaintiff and English contract clauses to resolve a case involving a live plaintiff and Italian contract clauses.
This analysis is difficult to defend.
If the Lebedinsky court conducted a proper analysis, moreover,
it would be difficult to see how the defendant could have prevailed.
The plaintiff asserted that she had suffered more than $750,000 in

146
Id. (citing Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243). The phrase “recourse to
judicial process” does not appear in section 30509.
147
Id.
148
Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243–44.
149
See Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 198.
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damages.150 If this is correct, then applying the damages cap imposed by the 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention would guarantee that she would recover only a portion of her losses (roughly
$568,000).151 Such an outcome is irreconcilable with section
30509.152
The great irony in Lebedinsky is that there was a simple argument—which went completely unaddressed by the court—for ruling
against the plaintiff. As noted above, section 30509 applies only by
its terms when the cruise ship is transporting passengers to or from
a U.S. port.153 The cruise ship in Lebedinsky never stopped at a U.S.
port.154 Instead, it “started in Venice, Italy, made several stops in
Italy, Greece, and Montenegro, and then terminated back in Venice.”155 Since the ship never put in at a U.S. port, section 30509 was
inapplicable by its terms. This fact alone should have allowed the
court to dismiss the plaintiff’s argument that the Italian forum selection clause was void on public policy grounds without any need to
rely on Myhra.156 At no point in its decision, however, did the Lebedinsky court make this connection. Instead, it cited Myhra for the
dubious proposition that enforcing foreign forum selection clauses
that will lead to the imposition of liability caps is fully consistent
with U.S. public policy.157
The record of the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit is no
more distinguished. In Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida cited Myhra
for the proposition that “the Eleventh Circuit held that § 30509 does
not prohibit forum-selection clauses that require litigation be
150

Id. at 202.
See supra note 8 (outlining caps related to 2002 Protocol to the Athens
Convention).
152
See 46 U.S.C. § 30509.
153
See Peltz, supra note 2, at 491, 496–97.
154
Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 198.
155
Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 18-cv-62522-UU, 2019 WL
9467673, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2019).
156
See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“The parties do not dispute that the Grand Princess voyage upon which plaintiff
and her husband sailed did not touch a United States port. Thus, the terms of
§ 183c(a) [the predecessor statute to section 30509] plainly do not apply to the
Passage Contract of plaintiff’s cruise.”).
157
Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 203–04.
151
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brought in a foreign jurisdiction.”158 In Carrington v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., the same court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
foreign forum selection clause was unenforceable on the grounds
that it had been “squarely dealt with and rejected by the Eleventh
Circuit in Estate of Myhra.”159 At no point in either case did the
court consider whether the factual differences between the injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs and the plaintiff in Myhra might be relevant. At no point in either case did the court consider whether the
laws of the chosen forum were different from the relevant U.S.
laws.160
CONCLUSION
The way forward for the Eleventh Circuit is clear. It should revisit its decision in Myhra and adopt a new framework for evaluating the relationship between foreign forum selection clauses and
section 30509.
First, the Eleventh Circuit should adopt a rule that a foreign forum selection clause in a cruise passenger contract is presumptively
unenforceable when the contract contains a choice-of-law clause selecting a jurisdiction that has ratified the Athens Convention. This
presumption is appropriate because the enforcement of the forum
selection clause in this context will in many cases lead to the imposition of a liability cap in contravention of section 30509. Second,
the court should offer the defendant the opportunity to rebut this
presumption by showing that the damages potentially recoverable
by the plaintiff in a best-case scenario under U.S. law would fall
below the liability cap. If the defendant can prove that the damages
under U.S. law will be less than the limits imposed by the Athens
Convention, the foreign forum selection clause should be enforced.
If the defendant cannot make this showing, the clause should be
158

Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1249 (S.D. Fla.

2020).
159

Carrington v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., No. 10-25166-CIV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76363, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2020). In Turner, the cruise ship at issue also
never put in at a U.S. port. See Turner, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. Section 30509
was therefore inapplicable by its terms and the case could have been resolved on
this basis alone.
160
See Turner, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1246–57; Carrington, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76363, at *4.
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deemed unenforceable, and litigation may continue in the United
States.
There is no question that this approach imposes a heavy burden
on the defendant. It will frequently be difficult for the cruise company to prove a plaintiff’s best-case scenario with respect to damages falls below the liability cap at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Nevertheless, this approach represents the only practicable way for
the courts to give effect to the statement of public policy contained
in section 30509. To hold otherwise would be to allow the cruise
companies to use a combination of choice-of-law clauses and forum
selection clauses to achieve an end that is flatly prohibited by federal
law—the limitation of cruise ship company liability via contract
when a cruise ship passenger suffers injury or death as a result of
negligence on the part of the company or its agents.161

161

After this Article was substantially complete, the author was engaged to
provide legal advice and support to an attorney suing a cruise company on behalf
of a foreign passenger. The case ultimately settled before trial.

